[Lu Wei] Community priority or society priority?

Abstract: "Community" is the "core concept" contributed by folklore scholars to the Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage.

When it entered into legislation without reflection, the concept of "community" left a legal gap for the practice of communitarianism.

On the one hand, the "Amendment to the Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage" is intended to theoretically block the practical possibility of communitarianism, and on the other hand, it is also intended to clarify the logical starting point of folklore practice.

Keywords: Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage; folklore; practice; community-community; social author profile: Lu Wei, researcher at the Institute of Literature, China Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing 100732).

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Article 6 of the UNESCO Ethical Principles for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage (hereinafter referred to as the "Ethical Principles") stipulates: "Each community, group or individual shall assess the value of the intangible cultural heritage it holds, and such heritage shall not be subject to external evaluation of value or significance." In the article "Opposing Communitarianism-Understanding Intangible Cultural Heritage also from a Verbal Level", the author once called this community proposition that does not accept the "external" value or significance test, judgment, assessment)-the "improper...

application" of Kant's so-called "freedom according to universal laws"-"communitarianism".

Before and after the publication of this article, academic colleagues Zhang Duo, Tang Lulu, An Deming, Hu Xiaohui, etc.

privately or publicly criticized me tactfully for calling the above regulations "communitarianism." Zhang Duo believes:

Lu Wei's opposition to "communitarianism" is mainly aimed at Article 6 of the "Ethical Principles", which particularly emphasizes that the will of the community cannot undermine the universal principles of human rights...

However, Lu Weizhi's criticism is biased in that he did not regard the "Ethical Principles" as a whole and separate Article 6 for analysis, which ignores the efforts of the "Ethical Principles" to take into account the interests of both inside and outside the community and the principles of universal human rights.

Tang Lulu pointed out: The application form of UNESCO's "Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity" requires intangible cultural heritage to comply with existing international human rights documents.

This is an indicator to examine whether a certain intangible cultural heritage has "communitarianism".

In addition, the Convention has similar requirements.

Therefore,"From a theoretical perspective, Lu Wei's views reflect the fear of the possibility of communitarian errors, and are generally consistent with the goal of the 2003 Convention; however, criticism of Article 6 of the Ethical Principles should also be considered within the overall framework of the Convention."

An Deming also criticized the author's "worries" without naming names:

Emphasis on community-centered protection of intangible cultural heritage...

but will this lead to local or group conservatism? This kind of worry is not unreasonable...

Fortunately, UNESCO is sufficiently vigilant and preventive against the possible negative effects caused by emphasizing the community-centered principle in the practice of intangible cultural heritage protection.

If we combine this with the purpose of intangible cultural heritage protection, we will have a clearer understanding.

Zhang Duo, Tang Lulu, An Deming and other colleagues criticized the relevant and had basically the same opinion.

They all believed that the "purpose" and its provisions of the Convention and the Ethical Principles should be considered "holistically", rather than simply mentioning the provisions of Article 6 to negate the Convention and the Ethical Principles "as an attempt to take into account the interests of both inside and outside the community and the principles of universal human rights." However, while accepting the above-mentioned pertinent criticisms from colleagues, the author also believes that in addition to being "biased in criticism", Zuwen's position and views are more vague in expression, that is, he has not completely escaped the legislative practice of understanding and interpreting the Convention and the Ethical Principles solely from the perspective of the daily use of words.

Therefore, in this article, the author intends to re-discuss the regulations themselves of the Convention and the Ethical Principles from the perspective of academic use of concepts.

That is to say, although "we regard the Convention and the Ethical Principles as a whole," if we view the Convention and the Ethical Principles not from the way we use daily words, but from the way we use academic concepts, we will find problems with the Convention and the Ethical Principles themselves.

Jacob and Tang Lulu believe that the problems existing in the Convention and the Ethical Principles themselves are mainly manifested in that on the one hand, they achieve "internal autonomy" of the empowered subject through the compulsory empowerment of "external intervention", and on the other hand, they "regulate and guide" the "internal autonomy" of the empowered subject, thus constituting a new kind of intervention.

Therefore, the Convention and the Ethical Principles present conflicts and tensions in the overall framework.

The reason why the Convention and the Ethical Principles present a "tense conflict" between "external intervention" and "internal autonomy" may be because: on the one hand, the drafters and parties of the Convention have positioned the protection of "intangible cultural heritage" between moral legislation and "cultural governance"; On the other hand, those who regard the Convention and the Ethical Principles as moral legislation do not clearly distinguish between their legislative principles, namely, legislative purposes and legislative methods-according to Kant-whether they are the ethical intrinsic legislative morality of virtue theory) or the juristic external legislative law of the theory of legal rights).

Without the understanding of moral intrinsic legislation and external legislation, we may blur the legislative nature of the Convention and the Ethical Principles.

This is exactly what Hu Xiaohui criticized me.

One distinction may be worth noting, that is, even in Kant, the intrinsic legislation of morality and the external legislation of law are different, and the standards are different.

The standards of law are not pure, that is, elements that allow empirical considerations.

It may be said that morality is a high standard, while law is a low standard or bottom-line standard.

Is the Convention moral or legal? This seems to be a question that should be considered.

In Kant's view,"law" also belongs to moral legislation in the broad sense, but Kant regards "law" as the external legislative law of morality) to distinguish it from moral legislation in the narrow sense, that is, the internal legislative ethics of morality).

The intrinsic legislation of morality--the principle of legislative purpose--that is, the subject person) out of universal free will, using pure practical reason, according to objective moral principles and laws of virtue), inherently self-enforces "internal autonomy") subjective behavioral motivations, intrinsic intentions, objects out of moral responsibility or moral obligation.

On the other hand, the external legislation of morality-in terms of the purpose-method of legislative principles-means that the subject people) generally out of free will, use pure practical reason, and in accordance with the objective legal principle "law of legal rights"), externally and interactively coerce "external intervention" forces) the subject's objective action results and external intended objects not to violate the legitimacy of "legal obligations" or "legal obligations"; At the same time, it does not merely impose the moral nature of the subjective behavioral motivation, the intrinsic intention object, out of moral responsibility or moral obligation.

This is because the essence of all moral legislation-whether moral internal legislation or moral external legislation-is to maintain the self-discipline of the subject's subjective behavior, motivation and intention, so it is possible to have sincere but not hypocritical practical morality).

Therefore, in order to maintain the possibility of self-discipline in the form of the subject's subjective behavioral motivation and intention, under the conditions of moral intrinsic legislation, it is inevitable that the subject inherently self-forces the subjective behavioral motivation and the intrinsic intention objects are consistent with or even out of moral responsibility or moral obligation; However, under the conditions of moral external legislation, subjects interact externally to force the objective action result that the external intended object does not violate the legitimacy of legal obligations or legal responsibilities, but at the same time, they do not interact externally to force the subjective behavioral motivation, the intrinsic intended object to be out of or just consistent with the morality of moral obligations.

It is also inevitable-thus embodying the moral attribute of maintaining moral self-discipline, the essential stipulation of the moral law and the ultimate purpose of moral legislation.

As far as the latter is concerned, only when the external legislation of morality only externally interacts between subjects to force the result of subjective objective actions to not violate the legality of legal rights laws and legal obligations, can it provide a possibility condition for the self-discipline of the subject's subjective behavioral motives and intentions form; even if the subject does not necessarily internally force the moral nature of his subjective behavioral motives and intrinsic intentions to conform to or even out of virtue laws and virtue obligations based on this self-discipline possibility condition.

Conversely, if moral external legislation interactively forces the intrinsic intended object of the subject's subjective behavioral motivation to be out of or only in line with the moral nature of moral responsibility or moral obligation, it will instead lead to heteronomy in the form of the subject's subjective behavioral motivation and intention.

Now, based on the above analysis and explanation of the legislative principles of moral legislation, namely, legislative purposes and legislative methods, the author prefers to believe that the "Convention" and "Ethical Principles" are first and foremost a "moral convention", especially a moral convention for external legislation, rather than a "Cultural Governance" Ordinance.

Although "cultural governance" still needs to formulate temporary policy and even long-term institutional management measures based on the legal responsibilities or legal obligations of moral external legislation.

In this way, through an analysis of the legislative principles of external moral legislation, that is, legislative purposes and methods, Article 6 of the "Ethical Principles", which are subordinate to the "overall framework" of the Convention, stipulates that "each community, group or individual should evaluate the value of the intangible cultural heritage it holds, and this heritage should not be subject to external value or significance judgment", which provides the theoretical rationality of autonomous empowerment of legal rights laws.

That is to provide self-discipline possibility conditions for the subjective behavioral motivation and intention form of the subject.

Zhang Duo and Tang Lulu criticized the author for being "biased" in their criticism of the provisions of Article 6 of the "Ethical Principles" and being superfluous in their "worry" about the outcome of the contract, which gave them corresponding practical legitimacy.

Because the achievement of "internal autonomy" through "external intervention"-that is, the mandatory empowerment of the conditions for the possibility of self-discipline in the form of subjective behavioral motivations and intentions-is originally a moral "bottom-line standard" stipulation based on the principle of human rights as the law of legal rights; As for the actual contingency or probability of the implementation of communitarianism, it should not be imposed on the moral external legislation itself of the Convention and the Ethical Principles.

In this way, Zhang Duo and Tang Lulu's criticism of the author based on the "overall" consideration of the Convention and the "Ethical Principles" will have reasonable and effective legitimacy.

Despite this, the author still has reason to doubt that the "improper...

application" of communitarianism to "freedom according to universal laws" is really irrelevant to the "overall framework" of the Convention and the Ethical Principles.

Perhaps the problem still lies in "problems that may exist in these international instruments themselves", thus theoretically reserving legal space for the "improper...

application" of autonomy empowerment to communitarianism.

However, the legal space reserved by the Convention and the Ethical Principles for the "improper...

application" of communitarianism is not "tension" due to the "tense conflict" between "internal autonomy" and "external intervention" in the "overall framework" as Jacob and Tang Lulu said; Because, if "internal autonomy" is originally a moral external legislative law), the legislative principle of "external intervention", that is, the legislative purpose of the legislative method, without considering the specific practice of "regulating and guiding" autonomous subjects,"it constitutes a new kind of" intervention "and other specific provisions, there is no" tense conflict "or" tension "in terms of the" overall framework "of compulsory autonomy empowerment and compulsory empowerment of autonomy.

In Kant's words, the "overall framework" of the Convention and the Ethical Principles as external legislation of morality "cannot be conceived as two parts ['external intervention' and 'internal autonomy']." Because, in the external legislation of morality,"the right of [internal autonomy or] legal rights and the power of [external intervention] enforcement have the same meaning", that is,"according to the law of contradiction, while being connected with [autonomy] legal rights, there is a kind of coercion [restricts] the power of those who infringe legal rights."

However, if "in accordance with the law of contradiction", the Convention and the Ethical Principles, as external legislation of morality, cannot be distinguished into "internal autonomy" and "external intervention" in the "overall framework" as Jacob and Tang Lulu said, then how can we leave a legal gap for communitarianism? This leaves only one possibility, that is, the Convention and the Ethical Principles themselves lack the legal provisions on the autonomous entities that should be empowered.

Tang Lulu pointed out:

"Community, group, and sometimes individual" appears as a whole principle in all UNESCO standard documents related to intangible cultural heritage; but whether in the field of research or in the practice of intangible cultural heritage protection, the word "community" seems to have been given privileges, and the "exposure" is significantly higher than the "group, sometimes individuals" that is juxtaposed with it.

The reason is quite complex.

It may be that "community" is used as the abbreviation for "community","group", and "individual", or it may be that this concept is used to reduce the confusion between the three.

In short, UNESCO has never clearly defined these three concepts in order to keep the concepts open; all attempts to accurately define them have failed.

According to Mark Jacob, who knew better:

In fact, whether "community","group","individual" or even "participation"), the power and problems, possibility and challenge, adaptability and confusion that exist in these core concepts are not clearly defined.

In 2002 and 2003, attempts to attach a glossary containing some definitions or explanations to the convention then under preparation ultimately failed...

However, the Intangible Cultural Heritage Branch of the UNESCO Secretariat...

and its ghostwriters...

seem to want to reduce "problems","confusion" or "complexity" in another way, by giving privileges to the word "community" while ignoring "group" and "individual".

If you review drafts submitted to intergovernmental committees...

or expert meetings...

over the past 10 years, you will find that the word "community" is used far more than "group" and "individual." This is usually because "community" or "community related" is used as a simple reference, but this is not entirely true.

There is indeed a detectable and recurring bias in this set of documents where interventions are evident.

...

If this bias in the draft is not adjusted, the word "community" may completely obscure the style of the other two "triplets"-"group" and "sometimes individuals"...

This may not be a matter of deliberate exclusion or rejection, but more a result of positive differential treatment...

because the word "community" often seems to have a warmer, positive, romantic, idyllic or more understandable connotation.

So, what kind of "warmer, more positive, romantic and idyllic connotations" have experts in the international academic community given to the concept of "community" without knowing it, so that they have decided that in the Convention and the Ethical Principles,"community" actually has a logical priority in autonomy and empowerment compared to "individuals"? The "individual" could have theoretically been used as a prerequisite to limit the self-expansion of communitarianism.

In this way, further analysis and judgment of the main provisions of the Convention and the Ethical Principles on the legislative objects of "communities, groups, and sometimes individuals" will help rethink the following issues: The paradox of the Convention and the Ethical Principles as the legislative rationality itself of external legislation of morality may not originate from the "tension" between the "factors" of "external intervention" and "internal autonomy" in the "overall framework" due to the "tense conflict", because the two originally have the legislative principle that maintains the possibility of self-discipline in the form of subjective intention of the subject based on external legislation of morality, that is, the identity of legislative purpose and method.In fact, this paradox mainly originates from the fact that the Convention and the Ethical Principles establish the legal provisions of empowered subjects, the "post-modernity", subjective relativity, cultural diversity) and "community" propositions that developed countries need, obscuring the "modernity" and "society" propositions based on "individuals" that developing countries still urgently need, rather than the "intangible cultural heritage" propositions of developing countries defeating the "folk customs" propositions of developed countries.

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Since the German classical sociologist Tönnies (Tönnies) conceptually distinguished the German word Gemeinschaft (which translates into "community") and Gesellschaft (which translates into "society"), the difference between "community" and "society" has become common sense in the academic world.

However, in our folklore community, this common sense is often ignored intentionally or unintentionally.

This is because, after the Enlightenment, that is, logically, after reason, the emotional connection between folklorists and traditional communities became more and more "cut and confused", so when it comes to "community", there is a feeling of "warmer, positive, romantic, idyllic or more understandable connotations" in my heart.

In Chinese, community was translated not only as "community" but also as "community" in the 1930s.

According to Zhu Gang,"In the 1930s, American sociologist Parker visited China.

At that time, Mr.

Fei Xiaotong, who was still a student at Yanjing University, and other students thought about it before translating community into 'community'." So what is the difference between "community" and "community"? What is the difference between "community" and "society" in the first place? I still followed Zhu Gang's explanation to further explain this issue.

As early as 1887, Tannes...

made a classic distinction between society and community in his book "Community and Society", which he defined as "all intimate, private and exclusive co-existence" and "a complete unity of human will in a primitive or natural state." Since then, this definition of community has become the mainstream of academic circles, and has gradually been cast into a rigid concept that is not very flexible.

Based on this, we roughly understand that Tannis's so-called "community" refers to the kind of blood, region, language and other cultures that are naturally formed due to emotional and customary relationships under the autocratic will of the "divine power of the monarch").) Groups, groups or collectives, groups have been mainly used to refer to traditional monarchies in modern times; comparatively speaking,"community" has been mainly used to refer to small community tribes, families, etc.

relative to large community countries).

"Society" refers to a group, group, or collective, group that is artificially constructed through the rational contractual relationship of free will between people (individuals).

Furthermore, the Enlightenment movement in modern times is to transform the monarchical community of natural emotions, that is, a country where "the monarch is the most important" and "home and the world", into a free and rational democratic society, that is, a country where "the people are the most important" and "the people are the masters of the country." Of course, in the rational enlightenment of free will, there was also a deviation, that is, the exclusion of legitimate sexual emotions from participating in general legislation; thus, there were romantics who criticized the enlightenmentists for destroying human emotions.

Romantics believe that freedom without emotions is not real freedom; while the Enlightenment's practice of excluding emotions from participating in general legislation violates the Enlightenment's freedom principle.

Romantics regarded themselves as liberals based on emotional conditions, and the Romantic movement arose.

That is to say, the Romantic movement in modern times arose on the basis of the Enlightenment movement-that is, the logical "after" accepting the liberal principle of Enlightenment.

Not only did the Romantics not oppose the principle of freedom of Enlightenment, but they wanted to push the principle of freedom to the extreme of emotional conditions, that is, the emotional will should be the first element of the principle of freedom.

However, the romantics also have their overcorrection, that is, while criticizing rational society, they also love and rely too much or even completely on the emotional community.

To this end, Romanticism uses the theoretical understanding that the Enlightenment has used very well-empirical scientific methods, and vigorously explores the myths, legends, stories, folk songs, epics, narrative poems, dramas, proverbs, Folk literature-folk aesthetic genres-that express emotions such as riddles-but the enlighteners and the romantics held each other on the principle of legislation but were also based on the principle of free will), but produced an unexpected and wonderful result: At least in Europe, modern democracy-nation states are based on the principle of free reason in democratic societies and the "community of imaginary [national culture]" Anderson) Natural emotions are of course no longer emotions towards God but emotions of man's self) The dual ideology) of the principle-but the logical status between the dual principles is unequal: If reason is the starting point of transcendental logical reasoning of modern democratic countries and determines the social institutional nature of democratic countries, then emotion is only the intuitive starting point of modern nation-states, which only imagines the community cultural origin of nation-states-as far as it affects, post-developing modern countries mostly follow this dual ideological construction principle of "social-community".

For example, the "two purposes" of the "academia and literature" of the folk song movement proposed by the "Folk Song Weekly" of the May 4th Movement in modern China can only be placed in the context of the "democracy and science" of the May 4th Movement-as the "wing" of the new cultural and new literary movement of the May 4th Movement-can the folk song movement have its practical legitimacy based on the principle of freedom.

Otherwise, it will be the purely aesthetic emotional narcissism of romanticism, with extremely dangerous consequences.

In other words, romanticism actually presupposes the rational principles of enlightenment.

Otherwise, romanticism will cover up with irrational emotions and overstep people's own rational nature, resulting in the "original sin" of romanticism.

20th century Romantic Folk Literature and Art)-The repeated manifestations of "original sin" in folklore, such as Nazi folklore and other theories of racial superiority that use the principle of natural emotions to theorize reason) Overwhelming or even abandoning the principle of free reason to practice reason) The practice of ideological disciplines is the result of using the theory of the origin of natural emotion community to cover up and override the nature of free and rational society.

Among them, the romantic folk literature and art (folklore), which relies on ideology, played a negative role in aiding and fueling the flames.

This made romantic folk literature and art scholars in various countries unable to straighten their backs after the war.

They even came up with a way to abolish the naming of the folklore discipline to wash away the shame in their hearts.

The word folklore caused folklore scholars to bear too many memories of "original sin"), or tried every means to escape into the so-called "pure academic" empty door that was not related to politics or even reality.

As a result, Gao Bingzhong criticized it as a "study of literature and history" that "loves the past and develops the wisdom of literati and scholars who cherish the tranquility of the past."

Among China folklore scholars in the new era after the 1980s, Gao Bingzhong was the first young scholar to implement Zhong Jingwen's proposition that folklore should be "contemporary studies." Of course, later, Gao Bingzhong revised his views on his "intellectual game" folklore on "formalism research on folklore." Gao Bingzhong realized that even "purely academic" and "literary and historical research" in the form of "formalism" and "intellectual game" actually still bear the legitimate imaging-proof function of "Cultural China." In other words, Romantic folklore, which originated from Enlightenment, has always been based on certain value principles, although the "purely academic" subject imagination itself seems to be just the emotional narcissism of Romantic folklore scholars.

However, since romantic folklore is inseparable from certain value conditions, then consciously reflecting on its own value conditions, rather than arbitrarily attaching itself to unreflected value conditions like Nazi folklore, should be a reasonable way for folklore to overcome "original sin." However, today's folklore scholars seem to have forgotten their own "original sin" of modernity, or the "original sin" of modernity seems to be in the distant past and has long been completely irrelevant to today's folklore.

But in my opinion, the "original sin" of modernity in folklore still follows folklore like a nightmare.

For example, even if folklore scholars no longer regard the national ideology of a specific period as a value condition, they may still regard today's United Nations ideology as a value condition.

This was something we had never thought of before, because we had never thought of questioning whether the United Nations could be politically incorrect; furthermore, if we made any mistakes in the process of implementing the United Nations Convention, it must be our own misinterpretation of the "scriptures" and we will not blame them on the "scriptures" of the United Nations itself.

In the memory of our folklore scholars, the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage was formulated with the active participation of folklore scholars; conversely, it was folklore scholars who actively promoted the formulation of the Convention.

According to an article published in China by the famous Finnish folklorist Laurie Hangko in 1987, folklorists participated in the drafting and discussion of the original text of the Convention at least in the early 1980s.

However, the proposition of "intangible cultural heritage" was not yet proposed at that time.

Instead, it was still the classic concept of "folk literature" or "folk custom" in folk literature and art.

But words like "group" and "group" already appear in Hangke's Chinese text.

I don't have the original Finnish or English version of Hangke's articles from that time.

I don't know whether the original English version of the concept of "folk literature" in Hangke's Chinese version was folklore, and what the original English version of "group" and "group" was, but according to Hangke's so-called "folk literature, more broadly speaking, traditional and popular folk culture) is a group or individual creation, which is oriented to the group and passed down from generation to generation.

It reflects the expectations of this group.

It is an appropriate expression that represents the culture and social individuality of this group, and its norms and value concepts are passed down orally through imitation or other means."What folklorists tried to incorporate into the Convention was still the emotional aesthetic principles of the traditional natural community.

There is no conscious consciousness to reflect on the value conditions of the rational principles of the emotional aesthetic principles of the traditional natural community in modern free society.

This happened in the 1980s, when German folklore scholars 'reflections on World War II folklore, such as Baussinger's "Folk Culture in the Technological World"(1961), had been published for many years.

At the beginning of the "Introduction" to "Folk Culture in the Technological World", Bausinger wrote:

In 1934, in a leaflet titled "Five Difficulties in Writing Truth," Bertolt Brecht asked our era to say "residents" rather than "people": whoever makes this substitution "no longer supports many lies." The leaflet was printed in an illegal anti-fascist magazine and was set against the background of the Nazi state's one-sided politicization of the concept of "people." However, Brecht's statement is not only bound by the times, as if we no longer need to think about it today; it is precisely our book on today's "folk culture" that must face up to and think about his demands...

However, Bausinger's painful reflection did not enter the idea of Hangke drafting the "Draft Opinions on the Protection of Folk Customs" for UNESCO.

Perhaps it is because times have changed, in order to facilitate "each member state to make its own adjustments based on their own national conditions...

The Draft, author's note) must be flexible and leave room for free change." Now, according to translations by Yang Lihui, An Deming, Zhang Juwen and others, we know the concept of "group" and "speech community" in "Amos: artistic communication in small groups" that were widely used by American folklorists in the 1960s and 1970s: The concept of "community"(community) eventually entered the official text of the Convention, so that today's folklorists generally believe that "community" constitutes the "core concept" of the Convention.

Jacob) However, concepts such as "community" and "group" used by American folklorists at that time also did not or even avoided the critical test of theoretical rational reflection.

This cannot be used as an excuse for international cooperation "must be flexible and leave room for free change." In fact, the international folklore community's reflection on the "original sin" of the discipline has always stayed on the understanding of the historical contingency or probability of the external value conditions of the discipline concept, rather than deepening the logical inevitability of the intrinsic value conditions of the discipline concept.

Sexual understanding, in other words, if historical contingency no longer plays a role, Folklore scholars seem to be able to safely return to the traditional principles of natural emotion and even the strong proposition of postmodern folklore "communalism".

"Community" is the most reflective term in the 2003 Convention.

Respecting communities and community participation are the basic prerequisites for implementing "various measures" to protect intangible cultural heritage...

Although the Convention itself does not have a clear definition of "community", but...

empowering the value of intangible cultural heritage to relevant communities and groups, It is the "way to protection" that many folklore scholars and anthropologists have been painstakingly seeking during the conclusion of this international legal document.

It is no exaggeration to say that "losing" communities is tantamount to losing the cornerstone of the Convention.

...

The fundamental community-based stance of the Convention also establishes the basic orientation of a set of ethical principles as the primary principle...

The value recognition of "intangible cultural heritage" is officially empowered to the holders of the heritage, that is, what we usually call inheritors and practitioners, as well as the communities and groups to which they belong.

According to UNESCO regulations, appropriate or qualified intangible cultural heritage protection should always be carried out around the community-centered principle...

The essence of the Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage: community participation...

The Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage gives the above-mentioned cultural community groups and individuals a core role...

The Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage puts the community rather than heritage at its core, and the focus is precisely on the human, social and cultural context in which intangible cultural heritage can be continuously displayed...

Communities are intangible cultural heritage The authentic context, which means that communities can be either geographical or cultural.

Some folklore scholars have made statistics on the frequency of using the word "community" in international documents such as the Convention."Community" appears 10 times in the Convention and 14 times in the Ethical Principles.

In 2014 and 2016, the frequency of occurrence in the Business Guide was as high as 61 and 117 respectively.

"Word frequency" can certainly be used as a factual proof to judge the "core concepts" of the Convention; but can it be used as a logical explanation to judge the "core concepts" of the Convention? Of course, some folklore scholars will immediately quote the text of the Convention to refute the author, believing that the concept of "community" is based on the "core" of the principle of "human rights", thus theoretically eliminating the logical possibility of communitarianism in advance.

Referring to existing international human rights instruments, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966...

In this Covenant, only consideration will be given to the need for mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and intangible cultural heritage that conforms to sustainable development.

"Human rights principles" are of course a more "core" concept.

Therefore, as a legal-moral document, the Convention's autonomy proposition of "community" empowerment is indeed based on human rights principles and beyond doubt.

However, I still insist that the Convention's "reference" and "consideration only" of "existing international human rights instruments" or "documents" are just in name.

My reasons are: First of all, the Convention's provisions on "mutual appreciation","mutual respect","mutual assistance and cooperation","interaction" and "participation" among communities, groups and individuals are limited to moral advocacy of the subjective attitude towards the responsibility to protect, rather than legal constraints on the objective results of protecting rights.

Secondly, the Convention's vague expression of empowered subjects negates the theoretical possibility and even practical reality of the Convention's "reference" and "consideration" of human rights principles.

The Convention describes empowered autonomous entities as follows:

the communities, groups and individuals concerned).

communities, groups and, in some cases, Individuals).

With such a vague expression, it is no wonder that folklore scholars believe that the Convention "empowers the value of intangible cultural heritage to relevant communities and groups" and that "the significance of the Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage" lies in transferring rights and responsibilities to the community itself ", rather than ultimately fully opening the rights and responsibilities of intangible cultural heritage protection to everyone and all people inside and outside the community; Once the community is only empowered, it means that "each community, group or individual should assess the value of the intangible cultural heritage it holds, and such heritage should not be subject to external value or significance judgments." UNESCO "Under the conditions of reasons stipulated in Article 6 of the Ethical Principles for the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage), cover, The self-discipline possibility condition of overriding everyone or all people-including the subjective behavioral motivation and intention of the subject that "each subject of intangible cultural heritage must judge its internal value or significance from its own rational standpoint and actively use human rights as practical rules or ethical principles"-is to refuse rational reflection and critical testing of cultural values based on the universal principle of freedom.

This is not only a possibility that we can theoretically understand a priori, but also a reality that has been empirically proven by the practical research results of ethnography or folklore.

The first example comes from the field experience of American folklore scholars.

Through performances, the performers draw the audience's attention and energy, and the audience not only evaluates the performance, but also is attracted by the performance.

In this case, the performer gains a certain amount of authority and control over the audience-authority because he has proved his ability in the performance, and control because the clues that determine the interaction between the two parties are in his hands.

This universal rhetorical power of performance and its potential for social control have been widely documented.

If the performer gains control in this way, he may also gain the potential to transform the structure of society.

The second example comes from the field experience of China folklore scholars.

In order to promote their own opinions and achieve the situation of "standardizing legends" they hope for as soon as possible, folk elites often directly suppress different opinions.

As a result,"regional identity" will directly lead to "elite politics" and anti-human rights communitarianism.

Even in the latter example,"China Experience," folk elites "standardize legends" and "suppress disagreements" are actually based on the moral grounds of "political correctness," which Kant called "moral terrorism."

Regional identity arises without any disguise from the political differentiation of the region, and is a manifestation of a strong sense of collective history attached to the region.

The core of regionalism is elite politics, and the practice of elite politics relies on the manipulation of cultural forms, religious myths, and loyal relationships.

Therefore, on the one hand, regionalism is a strong suspicion of the conscious belief in modernity that dominates society, and on the other hand, it is also the fulcrum of mainstream culture in modern society.

The resurgence of local culture and the past on which regional identity relies are ideal topics for criticizing ethnography.

Critical ethnography seeks to expose that cultural concepts are accepted as common sense because they are part of the political and economic process of contemporary America.

In view of this, in order to avoid the "elite politics" of "regional identity", it is necessary to make certain amendments to the Convention; and the reason for the amendment is: If the empowered autonomous entities "communities, groups and individuals" are regarded as parallel relations, even compared to the empowered autonomous entities "groups and communities","individuals" are only optional "sometimes" rather than "always" in a logical order of priority; Then, the "public will" of the empowered autonomous subject "community, group" may have the theoretical possibility of coercing and suppressing "individuals" and "private will" or even ignoring and contempt the general "public will".

At the same time, this means that the "Amendment to the Convention" proposed by the author is only a fine-tuning of the expression but it is indeed an adjustment in principle), that is, it is only a re-expression of reordering the plural subjects of intangible cultural heritage protection and empowerment, that is, it is not just to protect the "communities, groups, and sometimes individuals" of cultural inheritors under a benign cultural ecology, Instead, first and always adhere to the "individual → group and community" of citizens in the state of good faith citizenship-that is, the re-exploration and discovery of the previous folklore scientists 'unknowing and unconscious concept of "individual"-based on the value of the free and rational principle of "society" based on the principle of natural emotion that ensures "community-community".

To use a more popular saying in Gao C, it is: "Start with the 'personal story'."

In this way, if we say that yesterday's European and American folklorists have contributed folklore theoretical concepts such as community (community) and group (group) to the Convention; Then, today's China folklore scholars will continue to contribute to the "Amendment to the Convention" to re-order "individuals" with "community" and "group" that is, to "regard individuals as the starting point, starting point and foothold of the community" in order to re-establish the concept of "positioning" and "community-community") to truly become a practical proposition of folklore with "warmer, positive, romantic, idyllic or more easy-to-understand connotations." This is just as Bausinger said in the 1960s, the "original sin" of the discipline of folklore is "not just bound by the times, as if we no longer need to think about it today"; But to this day, folklore scholars still have to face up to and think about the "original sin" of our discipline, that is, the logical starting point of the practical value conditions of the discipline theory.

This has been inserted into the Convention by international folklore scientists, which seems to be self-evident rather than reflective.

The concept of "community" is once again reasonably proven in the form of counterexample.

(This article is published in "Folk Customs Research", issue 03, 2021, with the annotations omitted, see the original issue for details)